
Understanding, Detecting and Localizing Partial Failures in Large System Software

[NSDI'20] Chang Lou etc.

Understanding, Detecting and Localizing Partial Failures in Large System Software


Partial Failures

 A fault not crash system but causes safety or liveness violation or server slowness



Modern Software Suffers Partial Failrues

Modern software is complex so that is easily subject to partial failures



Understanding, Detecting and Localizing Partial Failures in Large System Software

Study Methodology


• 100 partial failure cases from five large, widely used software systems

• Interestingly, 54% of them occur in the most recent three years' software releases (average lifespan of all systems is 9 years).

Software	Language	Cases	Versions	Date Range
ZooKeeper	Java	20	17 (3.2.1–3.5.3)	12/01/2009–08/28/2018
Cassandra	Java	20	19 (0.7.4–3.0.13)	04/22/2011–08/31/2017
HDFS	Java	20	14 (0.20.1–3.1.0)	10/29/2009-08/06/2018
Apache	С	20	16 (2.0.40–2.4.29)	08/02/2002-03/20/2018
Mesos	C++	20	11 (0.11.0–1.7.0)	04/08/2013–12/28/2018

Study Scope

• Process-level



Main Findings

- The root causes of studied failures are diverse (Figure 2)
 - Top three (total 48%) root cause types: uncaught errors, indefinite blocking, and buggy error handling
- The Majority of failures violate liveness (Figure 3)
 - Functionality stuck (48%), slow operations (17%)




Figure 2: Root cause distribution. *UE*: uncaught error; *IB*: indefinite blocking; *EH*: buggy error handling; *DD*: deadlock; *PB*: performance bug; *LE*: logic error; *IL*: infinite loop; *RL*: resource leak.




Figure 3: Consequence of studied failures.

Main Findings

• Most cases (71%) triggered by unique production workload or environment

- Long debugging time
 - The median diagnosis time is 6 days and 5 hours

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ZK-602


Features of Partial Failures

Common in modern software

Long debugging time

Production-dependent

Diverse root causes



Certainly need detecting and localizing

Static approaches could not work well


Manually writing checker is unrealistic


Automatically construct runtime checkers

Understanding, Detecting and Localizing Partial Failures in Large System Software

Design Principle: Intersecting with Main Program

Partial failures typically involve specific software feature and bad states





Three Characteristics of Runtime Checker


Customized: tailored to monitored modules

• Stateful: entailing specific input and program state

Concurrent: decoupled with main program without delaying its executions

Core Idea: Mimic Checker

• Imitating representative operations in main program and detecting errors




Reflect the monitored process' status

Pinpoint the faulty module and failing instruction

Obtain Mimic Checker by Program Reduction

Selecting vulnerable operations and encapsulating them into checkers



Seven Steps for generating checkers

- 1. Identify Long-running Methods
- 2. Locate Vulnerable Operations
- 3. Reduce Main Program
- 4. Encapsulate Reduced Program
- 5. Add Checks to Catch Faults
- 6. Validate Impact of Caught Faults
- 7. Prevent Side Effects

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1.Identify Long-running Methods

Identifying long-running loops in each call graph node

 Coloring invocation in long-running loops recursively

```
public class SyncRequestProcessor {
    public void run() {
        while(running) {
            if(logCount > (snapCount / 2))
                zks.taskSnapshot();
public class DataTree
    public void serializeNode(OutputArchive oa, ...)
        String children[] = null;
        synchronized (node) {
            scount++;
            oa.writeRecord(node, "node");
            children = node.getChildren();
```

2.Locate Vulnerable Operations

Use heuristics to locate vulnerable operations in long-running methods

I/O, synchronization, resource, communication related method invocations, ...

```
public class SyncRequestProcessor {
    public void run() {
       while(running) {
            if(logCount > (snapCount / 2))
                zks.taskSnapshot();
                                  long-running method
public class DataTree {
    public void serializeNode(OutputArchive oa, ...) {
        string children[] = null;
        synchronized (node) {
            scount++;
            oa.writeRecord(node, "node");
            children = node.getChildren();
```

3. Reduce Main Program

Top-down reduction: retaining vulnerable operations

```
public class SyncRequestProcessor {
   public void run() {
       while(running) {
           if(logCount > (snapCount / 2))
               zks.taskSnapshot();
                                                                      public class SyncRequestProcessor$Checker {
                                                                          public static void takeSnapshot reduced() {
                                                                               serializeNode reduced();
                                                                          public static void serializeNode reduced(
public class DataTree {
                                                                              OutputArchive arg0, DataNode arg1){
    public void serializeNode(OutputArchive oa, ...) {
                                                                               arg0.writeRecord(arg1, "node");
       String children[] = hull;
       synchronized (node)
           scount++;
           oa.writeRecord(node, "node");
           children = node.getChildren();
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```

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4. Encapsulate Reduced Program

Analyzing and initializing arguments before reduced methods

```
public class SyncRequestProcessor$Checker {
    public static void takeSnapshot_reduced() {
        serializeNode_reduced();
    }

    public static void serializeNode_reduced(
        OutputArchive arg0, DataNode arg1){
        arg0.writeRecord(arg1, "node");
    }
}
```

Not executable due to missing definitions

```
public class SyncRequestProcessor$Checker {
    public static void takeSnapshot reduced() {
       serializeNode invoke();
   public static void serializeNode invoke(){
       Context ctx = ContextManager.serializeNode_reduced_context();
       if(ctx.status == READY){
            OutputArchive arg0 = ctx.args getter(0);
           DataNode arg1 = ctx.args.getter(1);
            serializeNode reduced(arg0, arg1);
   public static void serializeNode reduced(
       OutputArchive arg0, DataNode arg1){
       arg0.writeRecord(arg1, "node");
```

Get values of arguments from context

4. Encapsulate Reduced Program

Instrumenting main program to store contexts

```
public class SyncRequestProcessor {
                                                                           public class SyncRequestProcessor$Checker {
    public void run() {
                                                                               public static void takeSnapshot reduced() {
       while(running) {
                                                                                   serializeNode invoke();
           if(logCount > (snapCount / 2))
               zks.taskSnapshot();
                                                                               public static void serializeNode invoke(){
                                                                                   Context ctx = ContextManager.serializeNode reduced context()
                                                                                   if(ctx.status == READY){
                                                                                       OutputArchive arg0 = ctx.args getter(0);
                                                                                       DataNode arg1 = ctx.args.getter(1);
public class DataTree {
    public void serializeNode(OutputArchive oa, ...) {
                                                                                       serializeNode_reduced(arg0, arg1);
       String children[] = null;
       synchronized (node) {
           scount++;
                                                                               public static void serializeNode reduced(
           ContextManger.serializeNode reduced args setter(oa, node);
                                                                                   OutputArchive arg0, DataNode arg1){
           oa.writeRecord(node, "node");
                                                                                   arg0.writeRecord(arg1, "node");
           children = node.getChildren();
```

5.Add Checks to Catch Faults

 Safety checking relies on explicit error signals (assertions, exceptions, and error code)

Liveness checking relies on timers


• wd_assert API for semantics

```
public class SyncRequestProcessor$Checker {
    public static void takeSnapshot reduced() {
        serializeNode_invoke();
    public static void serializeNode invoke(){
       Context ctx = ContextManager.serializeNode reduced context();
       if(ctx.status == READY){
            OutputArchive arg0 = ctx.args getter(0);
           DataNode arg1 = ctx.args.getter(1);
           serializeNode_reduced(arg0, arg1);
    public static void serializeNode reduced(
       OutputArchive arg0, DataNode arg1){
        arg0.writeRecord(arg1, "node");
   public static Status checkTargetFunction0(){
       long startTime = System.currentTimeMillis();
        try{
            takeSnapshot reduced();
        } catch(Exception e){
           safetyViolation();
        long timeCost = System.currentTimeMillis() - startTime;
        if(timeCost > threshold){
            livenessViolation();
```


6. Validate Impact of Caught Faults

- A reported error may be transient or tolerant
 - e.g. a transient network delay that caused no damage
- Simply re-executing the checker and compare for transient errors
- Providing validation task skeletons :
 - Allowing developers write their own user-defined validation tasks
 - Automatically deciding which validation task to invoke depending on which checker failed.


- Context Replication
 - Preventing checkers from modifying the main program's states




- Context Replication
 - To reduce performance overhead: immutability analysis + lazy copy




- Context Replication
 - Checking consistency before copying and invocation with hashCode and versioning



- I/O Redirection and Idempotent Wrappers (I/O isolation)
 - Write: file-related resource replicated with target path changed to test file
 - Read: caching read results of main program



write-redirection



read-redirection

Evaluation

Evaluated Systems

Evaluate OmegaGen on six large systems

• ZK: ZooKeeper; CS: Cassandra; HF: HDFS; HB: HBase; MR: MapReduce; YN: Yarn

	ZK	CS	HF	HB	MR	YN
SLOC	28K	102K	219K	728K	191K	229K
Methods	3,562	12,919	79,584	179,821	16,633	10,432

Generated Watchdogs

• Watchdog generated by **static** analysis

• 60% of threads in production contains at least one watchdog checker

	ZK	CS	HF	HB	MR	YN
Watchdogs	96	190	174	358	161	88
Methods	118	464	482	795	371	222
Operations	488	2,112	3,416	9,557	6,116	752

22 Real-World Partial Failures

Id.	Root Cause	Conseq.	Sticky?	Study?
ZK1 [45]	Bad Synch.	Stuck	No	Yes
ZK2 [66]	Uncaught Error	Zombie	Yes	Yes
ZK3 [47]	Logic Error	Inconsist.	Yes	No
ZK4 [48]	Resource Leak	Slow	Yes	Yes
CS1 [7]	Uncaught Error	Zombie	Yes	Yes
CS2 [8]	Indefinite Blocking	Stuck	No	Yes
CS3 [12]	Resource Leak	Slow	Yes	No
CS4 [11]	Performance Bug	Slow	Yes	No
HF1 [29]	Uncaught Error	Stuck	Yes	Yes
HF2 [24]	Indefinite Blocking	Stuck	No	Yes
HF3 [23]	Deadlock	Stuck	Yes	No
HF4 [28]	Uncaught Error	Data Loss	Yes	No
HB1 [20]	Infinite Loop	Stuck	Yes	No
HB2 [19]	Deadlock	Stuck	Yes	No
HB3 [22]	Logic Error	Stuck	Yes	No
HB4 [21]	Uncaught Error	Denial	Yes	No
HB5 [18]	Indefinite Blocking	Silent	Yes	No
MR1 [35]	Deadlock	Stuck	Yes	No
MR2 [34]	Infinite Loop	Stuck	Yes	No
MR3 [36]	Improper Err Handling	Stuck	Yes	No
MR4 [33]	Uncaught Error	Zombie	Yes	No
YN1 [44]	Improper Err Handling	Stuck	Yes	No

Detection overview

- Baseline Detectors
 - Built-in detectors (heartbeat) in the six systems cannot handle partial failures as all
 - Implement four types of advanced detectors

Detector	Description
Client(Panorama [OSDI '18])	instrument and monitor client responses
Probe(Falcon [SOSP '11])	daemon thread in the process that periodically invokes internal functions with synthetic requests
Signal	script that scans logs and checks JMX metrics
Resource	daemon thread that monitors memory usage, disk and I/O health, and active thread count

Detecting Overview

- Methodology
 - Run checks every second
- Result
 - 20 out of 22 cases was detected

	ZK1	ZK2	ZK3	ZK4	CS1	CS2	CS3	CS4	HF1	HF2	HF3	HF4	HB1	HB2	HB3	HB4	HB5	MR1	MR2	MR3	MR4	YN1
Watch.	4.28	-5.89	3.00	41.19	-3.73	4.63	46.56	38.72	1.10	6.20	3.17	2.11	5.41	7.89	×	0.80	5.89	1.01	4.07	1.46	4.68	×
Client	*	2.47	2.27	×	441	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	*	4.81	×	6.62	×	*	×	×	8.54	7.38
Probe	*	×	×	×	15.84	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	4.71	×	7.76	×	×	×	×	×	×
Signal	12.2	0.63	1.59	0.4	5.31	×	×	×	×	×	×	0.77	0.619	×	0.62	61.0	×	×	×	×	0.60	1.16
Res.	5.33	0.56	0.72	17.17	209.5	×	-19.65	×	-3.13	×	×	0.83	×	×	*	0.60	*	×	×	×	×	×

Detection Localization

- Six level of decreasing accuracy
 - → faulty instruction
 - * faulty function
 - * faulty call chain
 - faulty entry
 - faulty process
 - O misjudged process

accuracy

• 55%(11/20) of the detected cases are pinpointed to faulty instruction

	ZK1	ZK2	ZK3	ZK4	CS1	CS2	CS3	CS4	HF1	HF2	HF3	HF4	HB1	HB2	HB3	HB4	HB5	MR1	MR2	MR3	MR4	YN1
Watchdog	> →	> →	•	*	> →	*	•	*	*	*	> →	> →	> →	> →	n/a	> →	*	> →	> →	*	≯ →	n/a
Client	n/a			n/a		n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a		n/a	O	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a		
Probe	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a		n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a		n/a		n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Signal		\Longrightarrow			→ →	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	→ →	> →	n/a	*	*	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	> →	→ →
Resource						n/a		n/a		n/a	n/a		n/a	n/a	n/a		n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a

More Detection Results

- Random fault-injection tests
 - Experiment on ZooKeeper
 - Inject four types of faults
 - Infinite loop
 - Arbitrary delay
 - System resource contention
 - I/O delay
 - Trigger 16 synthetic failures and 13 of them was detected
- A new bug
 - In Zookeeper version v3.5.5
 - Different from bugs in reproduction failures cases

False Alarms

 False alarms emerge when random nodes restart which leads to socket connection errors or resource contention

Validator mechanism significantly reduce false alarm ratio

	ZK	CS	HF	HB	MR	YN
watch.	0-0.73	0–1.2	0	0-0.39	0	0-0.31
watch_v.	0-0.01	0	0	0-0.07	0	0
probe	0	0	0	0	0	0
<u> </u>	0 0-3.4	0-6.3	0.05–3.5	0 0–3.72	0.33–0.67	0 0–6.1

Limitations

vulnerable operation analysis is heuristics-based

generated watchdogs are ineffective to catch silent semantic failures

Achieve memory isolation with static analysis-assisted context replication

OmegaGen generates watchdogs to report failures for individual process

watchdogs focus on fault detection and localization but not recovery

Conclusion

- Modern software systems become ever more complex
 - Existing solutions cannot capture partial failures among them

This work research partial failures via case studies

- OmegaGen: a static analysis tool that automatically generates customized checkers
 - Prove effective on reproduction databases
 - Report a new bug

Thanks

Comments are welcome!